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PROGRESS IN HUMANCAPITAL ANALYSES
OFTHE DISTRIBUTION OF EARNINGS
1.Introduction
According to a popular adage economists study choicebehavior,
while sociologists explain why thereare no choices to be made. In
this light, the label of economicsas a dismaFt science is surely
misplaced. In the same light, the traditionalstudies of income dlstri—
bution, a field with which economists
are becoming increasingly concerned,
must be described as basically sociological.That is, the traditional1
Prior to the rehabilitation of Adam Smith..
approaches tend to stress differences in
opportunity, ability, and chance
as Conditions largely unaffected by human choice.
The ascendancy of the human capitalapproach can be viewed as
a reaction of economists to thisnon—economic, though certainly not
irrelevant, tradition. In stressing the roleplayed by individual and
family optimizing decisions in humancapitalinvestments, important
aspects of income determination are brought back withinthe mainstream
of economic theory and within thepower of its analytical and econometric
tools.
Investment in human capital can take the formof expenditures
on education, job training, health,information, and migration——to list2
some of the major categories.
Such expenditures of resources of time,
money, and effort tend to augmentan individual's earning capacityand
thus can be viewed as investments,the augmentation of earnings being
the return on them.. Investment activitiesare undertaken by the mdi—
vidual and by his family within the constraintsof genetic endowment,
parental wealth, and access toeducational and market opportunities.
Economics is the analysis of constrained choices.Whether
the range and significance of these choicesis "large" or "small" in
the context of study of income distributionis a question amenable to
research, not a matter to be left to ideologicalpreconceptions. Nor
is investment in human capital the onlyelement of choice in the analysis
of income distribution. Adam Smith, no strangerto this part of the
world, listed a number of aspectsof job choices which affect the distri-
bution of labor incomes. These, he said,"are the principal circumstances
which so far as I have been able to observe,make up for a small pecuniary
gain in some employments, and counterbalance a great one in others:
first, the agreeableness or disagreeablenessof the employments them-
selves; secondly, the easiness and cheapness,or the difficulty and
thirdly,
expense of learning them;/theconstancy and inconstancy of employment
in them; fourthly, the small or greattrust which must be reposed in
those who exercise them; and fifthly,the probability or improbability
of success in them."2
2Adam Smith [193fl, p. 106.
NonpecuniarY aspects of wages, instabilityof employment,
uncertainty of success, and problemsof trust have been analyzed by3
economists, in a rather fragmentary fashion.3 Far more work needs to
3 Cf. Friedman and Kuznets [1945], Friedman [1953], Weiss [1972], Becker
and Stigler [1974].
be done on each of the topics suggested by Smith. The emphasis on human
capital investments——his point number two——should not distract our
attention from these aspects of work choices. Nevertheless, it appears
that the subject of human capital investments lends itself to a more
systematic and comprehensive analysis of wage differentials, than each
of the other factors. Perhaps also the current prominence of the subject
derives from a historical context: Students of economic growth were the
first to recognize the importance of human capital in analyzing the
modern evolution of industrial development.
The following is a description of research in the distribution
of labor incomes in which human capital theory serves as an organizing
principle. It is, in part, a sequel to my 1970 survey and, in part, a
report of ongoing research of my own and of others. Again, the emphasis
on human capital is not to be read as a denial of other aspects of choice
listed by Adam Smith, or of the "sociological" factors, which are best
viewed as constraints on choices, rather than as mutually exclusive
hypotheses. Put differently, the research reported below does not
inquire into all the forces and factors affecting the distribution of
income. Far more modest, the question is: what is the role and impact
of human capital investment decisions on the distribution and structure
of earnings. Though the question is partial, the theoretical framework
of the human capital approach is flexible. It is not a single, rigid4
model but a way of thinking capable of development in scope and complexity.
The appropriate concept of income based on human capital is labor income,
and the recipient unit the individual yorker. Ultimately, an inclusion
of non—employment incomes and aggregation of individual incomes into
family or household incomes will be needed for the analysis of the dis-
tribution of total household incomes.
I stop short of such aggregation in this report. Human capital
theory applies most directly to labor incomes. Since labor income is
by far the major component of personal income, except perhaps at the far
ends of the distribution, its analysis is the task of priority——particu-
larly for labor economists.
2. Earnings Profiles
The basic conceptual and observational unit of human capital
analysis is the lifetime earnings stream of the individual, not just his
earnings during a limited, say annual, period of time. Earnings at any
given time are viewed as a return on——a rental value of——the human capital
stock, the "skill level" which the individual has accumulated. Since
the size of the capital stock changes over the life cycle, growing by
means of investment and declining because of depreciation and obsolescence,
earnings change correspondingly over the life cycle. The characteristic
age profile of earnings shows rapid growth during the first decade of working
life, subsequent deceleration of growth and a leveling in the third and.
fourth decade. This is true when average earnings of "homogeneous"
cohorts are studied over time, net of economy—wide growth trends and
net of short—run fluctuations. Individual earnings profiles differ,
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even within such groups, in height (level), rate of growth (slope), and
the rate of change in the latter (curvature). In simplest terms, tie
personal or size distribution of earnings is viewed as a distribution
of the earnings profiles of the individual members of the labor force.
Thus the distributional analysis starts from its micro—economic
building blotk——the analysis of the individual income stream, the earnings
profile. The parameters of the individual earnings curve, its level,
slope and curvature, acquire specific economic interpretations in the
light of human capital analysis. The analysis of earnings distribution
then reduces to an analysis of the distribution of these parameters in
the population.
The economics in this analysis is to be found in the process
by which the individual earnings curve is generated. This process is
analyzable as an optimizing decision of the individual (and his family)
about the allocation of investments in his human capital stock over his
life cycle. Such optimization models were pioneered by Ben Porath (1967]
and by Becker [1967]. The models are undergoing continuous refinement,
but their essence is brought out in these early formulations. Briefly,
rational allocation requires that most of the investment in the person
be concentrated at younger ages. The investments may increase before
adolescence, but will continue at a diminishing rate throughout much of
a person's working life. Investments are not incurred all at once in
a short and early period, even though this would maximize the remaining
payoff period and total returns. This is because marginal costs of
producing human capital rise within the period. The solution is to
stagger investments over time at an eventually diminishing rate——both6
because benefits decline as the payoff period, the remaining working
life, shortens and as opportunity costs of time, which is an input in
the learning process, are likely to rise over the individual's working
life.
This reasoning applies to gross investments in human capital.
It also applies to net investments, provided the depreciation rate is
fixed or a positive function of time over the life cycle.
Since earnings are proportional to the level of the human
capital stock, they rise at an eventually diminishing rate and decline
when net investments become negative, if at all, in old age. The typical
working life earnings profile Is therefore concave, at least In percent
terms. Its average level is a positive function of total net investments
added to th initial endowment. Its rate of growth at any time is a
positive function of the net amount invested in the prior period,and
the degree of concavity depends on how rapidly investments decline over
-
time.
According to a popular alternative view, the individual earnings
curve is basically an Intrinsic age phenomenon: it reflects productivity
changes due to inherent biological and psychological maturation, leveling
of f in the middle years and declining later because of declining physical
and intellectual vigor. In the language of human capital, this view
explains the earnings profile by the depreciation rate alone:the rate
is negative in early years, zero in middle life, and positive in later
years.
There is evidence, however, to indicate that this inherent age
factor affects earnings only to a minor degree during the usual working
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life. In data where age and work experience are statistically separable,
the earnings curve is found to be mainly a function of experience, more than
of age, in terms of both its location in the life cycle and the sizes
and signs of its growth rates. Earnings profiles differ by occupation,
sex, and other characteristics in systematic ways not attributable to
the aging phenomenon.
Another interpretation of the shape of the earnings profile
as a "learning curv&' or a reflection of growth of abilities with age
and experience known as "learning by doing" is not at all inconsistent
with the human capital investment interpretation, provided it is agreed
that opportunities for learning are not costless. That is, given differ-
ential learning options among jobs and no insuperable barriers to labor
mobility, present values of earnings among the various learning options
will tend toward equalization among workers with similar capacities.
Thus labor mobility will impose opportunity costs of learning, by reducing
initial earnings of the steeper profiles below the initial earnings of
the flatter profiles. The relevant labor mobility applies, of course,
to workers with similar qualifications, that is, the same level of human
capital stock prior to entry into the labor market. This kind of invest-
ment in human capital via job mobility in the labor market is to be
distinguished from job training, formal or informal, on a given job or
"job ladder." But the analysis in human capital terms is the same. I,
therefore, prefer the term "post—school investmentsV which encompasses
both aspects of job investments, to the more narrow term which has come
to be known as the "on—the—job training hypothesis."
I now proceed to an exposition of the earnings function whichsummarizes in equation form the various categOries of human capital invest-
ments as determinants of earnings profiles. Thus far, the categories have
been broad, couched in life cycle intervals, such as schooling and post—
school investments, and most recently pre—school or "home" investments.
Future progress in the analysis of the earnings function lies in successive
refinements of content in these categories. Progress in the broadest sense
will require a development of structural relations to include determinants
as well as consequences of human capital investments.
S
3. Earnings Functions
A brief development of an individual's earnings function is
as follows:
Let C1 be the dollar amount of net Investment in period (t—l)
while "gross" earnings, that is, earnings from which the investment
expenditures are not netted out,are Eti. Let r_1 be the rate of
return on this particular instalment of investment, and assume——for
simplicity——thatr is the same in each period.4
4Aswith many other simplifying assumptions, this one can be relaxed,
giventhe purpose and the data.
Then: S
= Et_i+ rCti (1)
Progressive substitutions for Et_1 lead to:
t—1
(2)Et =E0+ r C ,where is the initial earning
j=o
S
capacity,a person's earnings if no subsequent investments were made in
him. If E0 originates at age 0, we can view it as the return on his9
genetic endowment. If the starting point is later, it is a mixture of
genetic and environmental influences. If the latter can be thought of
as investment activities, for example by parents in preschool children,
and separated out as such, it would be useful to include them in the
second term of equation (2).
Clearly, data on the individual instalments of investment are
not easily observable, except for formal schooling and training programs,
which are only a part of thestory. Even so, it is years of school
attainment and not dollar costs for which data are abundant. For this
reason alone, and for others to be mentioned later, it is preferable to
express the right—hand variables in the earnings function in terms of
"time spent in investment" rather than in dollar magnitudes. This Is
accomplished by viewing the ratio of investment expenditure to gross
earnings as a time—equivalent amount of investment:
Ct
Define Kt = (3)
Et
If t Iè a given year and Kt=20%, this means that 20X of the year'sgross
earnings was spent in investment. If the costs of investments are only
time costs, then K does, in fact, represent the fraction of theyear
spent in investment activities.
Substituting (3) in (1), we have
(4) Et =Et....i(l+rKt_1), andby recursion
Et =E0(l+rK0) (l+rK1) ... (l+rKti)
With rK a relatively small number, a logarithmicapproximation is10
appropriate, and:
t—i
inEt=lnE0+r E Kj (5)
Some investments are in the form of schooling, others take the
form of pre—school care, job training, job mobility, medical care, acqui-
sition of information, and so forth. At this stage of development of
the earnings functions, the K—terms have been segregated into two
categories, namely schooling and post—school investments.
Thus (5) can be written:
s—i t—i
in Et =inE0 + rs E K1 + r Z K. (6)
i=O j=0
where i runs over years of schooling, j over years of post—school exper-
ience. Ki are investment ratios during the school period, and K there-
after. The subscripts at r5 and r indicate that, in principle, the
average rates of return on schooling may differ from the average rates
of return on post—school investments.
Function (6) is specified in terms of net investment ratios
(K). Net investments can be decomposed into gross investment and
depreciation as follows: Let C_1 be the dollar amount of gross invest-
ment in period t—l, ó1 the depreciation rate of the stock of hinnan
c
capital, hence of earnings Et.1 during that period, and K —, the
Et
gross investment ratio.
ThenEt =Et..l+ r C_1 —
and ____= 1+ rK*1 —6t-l= + rKi ,byequation (5).
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Therefore, rKt =rK
—, andfunction (6) can be written:
in=inE0 + (r5K -)+(rK - (7)
Earnings functions (6) or (7) must be adapted for empirical purposes in
at least two respects.
First, the dependent variable Et which I term "gross earnings"
or "earnings capacity" is the earnings figure that would be observed If
the individual stopped investing in himself in period t. Continued
Investment means, however, that "net" earnings are smaller than Et
by the amount invested Ct. For practical purposes, I equate observed
with "net earnings."5
Note that observed earnings, as they are usually reported in statis—
tical accounts, would equal "net" earnings if C consisted only of
opportunity costs. Since direct expenditures are not usually "netted
out," observed earnings overstates net earnings somewhat. Given the
importance of opportunity costs in human capital investments, observed
earnings more closely approximate the "net" than the "gross" concept.
Since =Et(l—Kt), the earnings functions can be written:
(8) in =inEt+ in (l—Kt), substituting the appropriate
expressions from (6) or (7) for in Et.
Next, the investment ratios Kt or have to be given empirical
C,
content. In the schooling stage =, whereC are: foregone earnings
E
(E1), plus tuition and cost of living differential attributable to schooling,12
minus student earnings and student aid. Without knowing the C for each
individual, we know that K is not far from unity during school years,
and this is a convenient approximation.6 In the post—school stage, we
6It appears from 1960 U.S. data on college students that, on average,
student earnings plus scholarship roughly paid for tuition. Even if true
on average, thisassumption is worth relaxing when data are available,
as has been done in the recent work by Solmon [1972], Wachtel [1973],
Johnson and Stafford [1973], and Leibowitz [1974]. The correction for
quality requires relaxing the assumption that 1 during school years.
This requires expenditure data which differ among schools for the
numerator of K. Of course, expenditure data do not fully capture quality,
particularly in the public school system. Still, accounting for variation
in expenditures among schools was significant in the empirical analyses
in the references cited above. S
haveonly the theoretical hypothesis that K declines after completion
of schooling, when it was close to unity. Positive earnings upon entry
into the labor force mean that K <1,and since C eventually declines
to zero, so must Kj'. Note that a monotonic decline of K is not incon-
sistent with an initial constancyor even increase in C. This means
that concavity of logarithmic earnings profiles is not Inconsistent with
-
initiallinearity or even convexity of dollar earnings profiles.
My own experiments with specifying K or K* as functions of time
proved that the simplest linear specifications fit as well as other forms.
Recalling that K 1 and putting K =K
+ .t, when T* is the length
T
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of working life, we get:
*
(9P) in =in+ (r5-ô5)s + (rK)t -P02 + in (1-K)
Alternatively, in terms of net investment:
(lOP)in =inE0 + r5s + rK0t —rK0+ in (i—Ks)
Here T is the period of positive net investment, so that T<T*. Thus the
peak of earning capacity is reached some time before the end of working
life when depreciation nullifies or outstrips gross investment.7
dinEt
Putting =0,timing of peak earning capacity is t, =(1—_)T*.
dt rK
As gross investment continues to decline, the peak of observed earnings
will appear approximately -yearslater [Mincer, 1974, p. 21].
r
An alternative specification which I used is a geometric decline
**_ inthe investment profile: K =Ke
i 0
which leads to:
(9G)lnY =inE0 + (r5—5)s + t +r (l_et) + in (iK*)
or, in net investment terms:
K0
(lOG)in Yin E0 + r s + r (l_e8t) + in (1—Kt)
S
Here,8 is the annual percent rate of decline in the investment ratio K,
and the function (9 or lOG) is a Gompertz function, well known in studies
of industrial growth.
To the extent that hours of work vary over the life cycle, the14
profile of annual earnings is affected. Since capacity wage rates first
grow and later decline before retirement, they are likely to induce a
corresponding pattern of hours of work supplied to the market. This
assumes that over the life cycle the substitution effect of changes in
earning power due to human capital investments dominates the wealth
effect in the labor—leisure choice for a given individual. Incidentally,
hours of work are likely to peak before observed wage rates do because
(as noted in footnote 7 above) capacity wage rates decline before observed
wage rates do, given human capital depreciation.
While the life cycle profile of hours of work can be explained,
in part, by human capital investments, much of it is exogenous or transi-
tory. Since annual earnings are a product of wage rates and hours,
ln =inW + ln Ht ,alogarithmic hours variable should be attached
to the earnings function for standardizing purposes. Short—run variation
n time worked per year is not uncommon for a given individual, and it
is much greater across individuals.8
8By ignoring individual experience during the working life——our variable
t, and the actual amount of working time during the year (H), Jencks
[1972] was left with a huge, unexplained variance in his analyses of
income distribution, after experimentation with a large number of evi-
dently less important variables.
4. Empirical Analysis of Male Earnings, U.S. 1960
With a quadratic approximation for the last term ln(l—K) in
the earnings functions (9) and (10), the following simplest statistical
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estimating equation relates accumulated human capital to earnings at each
point in the working life:
(llP) in =
b0+ b1s + b2t + b3t2 + V
where b0 =inE0 —K0(l+); b1 =r8
K rrK0 K2
brK +—2(i+K); b 2p0 T 0
L2T 2T2
Standardizing for hours worked during the year:
(12P) in Y b0 + bs + b2t + b3t2 + b4lnH + U
b41, if hours and hourly wage rates are uncorrelated. If b41, the
coefficients of the other variables in (ii) will differ from those in
(l0a).
Similarly, for the Goinpertz function, with gross investment
ratios:
(hG) in =
b0+ b1s+ b2t + b3X + b4X2 + V
where + b2 =—
rK* rK*
b0inE0+1° b3— 1)O_K*
*2 b =r K 1 s 0
b, =— —
2
Standardization for hours worked during the year is obtained in an
equation (12G) by adding the term b5 lrt H ,asin (12P).
In my just—published study, equations (11) and (12) were applied16
to data of the 1/1,000 sample of the 1960 U.S. Census. The multiple
regressions were run on individual earnings of over 30,000 white, urban
males, nonstudents of pre—retirement age, who had some earnings in 1959.
The results are shown in Table 1.
Table 1
Findings of regression analysis
1. The regressions shown in Table 1 perforce assume the same
K—Profi1e for each individual (more precisely the same product rKt).
Despite the relegation of the unobservable individual differences in r
and in Kt into the residual variance, the two variables s and t alone
explained about 30% of total inequality.
Miong the other findings, the following are noteworthy, keeping
in mind the human capital interprc1ation of estimated parameters:
2. A negative coefficient for s2 suggests, as was found by
others, that the rate of return to schooling diminishes at higher levels
of schooling. However, the significance of the s2 term vanishes once
the employment variable (W =weeksworked) is added to the regression.
Thus, it appears that when earnings are measured in wage rages, there
is no decline in rates of return at higher schooling levels. Therefore
the differences in employment during the year almost fully account for
the higher rates of return at the lower levels of schooling when annual
earnings are compared.
3. The negative coefficient of the interaction term (st) shows
an apparent convergence of (logarithmic) experience profiles in the cross—STABLE 1
REGRESSIONSOF INDIVIDUAL EARNINGS ON SCHOOLING (s),
EXPERIENCE (x), AND WEEKS WORKED (14/)
(1959 annual earnings of white, nonfarm men)
Equation Forms
S(1)In Y= 7.58-f .070s .067
(43.8)
P(1)In Y= 6.20 f .107s+ .081t— .0012t .285
(72.3)(75.5) (—55.8)
P(2)In Y = 4.87 + .255s — .0029s -- .0043ts + .148t — .0018t .309
(23.4)(—7.1)(—31.8)(63.7) (—66.2)
P(3)In Y-- f(D.) + .068t — .0009t 1.207 In W .525
(13.1)(10.5)(119.7)
G(la)In Y= 7.43 - .llOs —- 1.651x,, .313
(77.6) (--102.3)
G(lb) In Y= 7.52± .113s -- 1.521x,, .307
(74.3) (101.4)
G(2a) In Y= 7.43± .108s— 1.172x,,-- .324x,+ 1.183 In W .546
(65.4) (—16.8)(- 10.2)(1054)
G(2b) In Y=7.50-I-.111S—1.291X,,.162X1+1.174Ifl W .551
(65.0)(—3.5) (—16.0)(107.3)
G(3)In Y= f(D..r)1.142 In W .557
(108.1)
G(4)In Y= 7.53 .109s — 1.192x,, — .146x, — .012t 4 1.155 In W .556
(—2.4)
NOTE: Figures in parentheses are t ratios. R = coefficient of determina-
tion; S =- linear form: P - parabohc form; G =- Gompertz form: D., = dum-
mies for schooling and experience: x,, = e = e"'; W= weeks
worked during 1959.17
section. Again, this term becomes insignificant whenweeksworked are
included in the regression.
4. Tentative estimates of I( and S are somewhat more
secure using the (G) functions: r is about 12%, K0 is 40—50%, and 5,
the depreciation rate, 1.2% per year. The K0 coefficient is disturbingly
high. It may confound a maturation phenomenon (negative value of 5 at
early ages) or is due to some other mlsspecification.
One data problem which affects these estimates is the absence
of direct information on the start of work experience. The average age
of completion of schooling was taken as an estimate of to. This defect
is remediable with appropriate data.
5. Adding variation in weeks worked (ln W) to the equations
raises their explanatory power to 55%. The coefficient at (ln W) is
significantly larger than unity, suggesting a positive correlation
between weeks worked and weekly earnings within schooling and experience
cells.
No doubt, one can maintain that the variables schooling (s),
years of work experience (t), and heurs of work during the year (II) are
rather obvious determinants of earnings, not requiring any analytical
structures such as human capital theory. Though I have no objections
to empirical fishing expeditions——indeed, they are quite useful——the
analytical structure provides guidance both for specification of variables,
equations, and equation forms and, most important, it provides inter-
pretation——a set of insights into the earnings structure linked together
by a story, albeit tentative and partial. Its viability becomes apparent
in the way the story "hangs together" and in the way the beginning of18
it leads to fuller developments in a disciplined fashion.
In this brief discussion of the findings I want to emphasize
the features contributed by the model——in distinction to ad—hoc analyses
which utilize similar variables among many others. I will not apologize
for the simplicity of a single equation with at most three substantive
and imperfectly measured variables: a first step must precede all the
others. I will defer to the later pages 'the description of the steps
which follow.
The contribution of the human capital model to the empirical
analysis can be seen in a number of features:
1. The earnings function expresses the earnings profile as
an individual growth curve. The Gompertz curve, for example, is a familiar
empirical representation of industrial growth. That it fits a personal
growth curve is not a coincidence, since the staggered investment inter-
pretation is suitable in both cases.
2. The coefficients of the function represent estimates of
(average) rates of return and of volumes of investment in schooling and
after schooling. It appears from calculations based on the estimates
that the rates of return and the total dollar volumes of investment are
of similar magnitude in both categories.
3. The experience variable (t or X) is a proxy for the
investment profile (Kt). It is measured in years of labor market
experience to represent cumulated investments in job training and in
job mobility. Ad—hoc analyses of earnings single out age. As already
noted, the distinction between age and experience is important: it helps
explain earnings profiles of workers who differ in levels of education.19
More educated workers of the same age have less work experience, since
they enter the labor market later. Since growth rates of earnings reflect
investment rates and these are a (negative) function of experience, growth
rates of earnings are stronger for the more than for the less educated
workers at given ages. This is the essence of the universally observed
and econometrically bothersome age—schooling interaction effect. With
experience as an explicit variable, the interaction effects on earnings
vanish.
A more dramatic example of the difference between age and
experience appears in the analysis of earnings of women, whose labor
market experience is frequently interrupted. Age is an especially poor
substitute for experience in that case. For the analysis of earnings
of workers whäse work experience is discontinuous the human capital
earnings function is well suited, provided work history data are avail-
able. This analysis is described in a later section.
4. The form of the earnings function depends on the units in
which the independent variables are expressed. If dollar earnings are
of interest, schooling and post—school investment variables must be
expressed in dollar volumes——a difficult task. The more readily avail-
able time variables require a semi—logarithmic equation form, that is, earnings
must be expressed in lagarithms, while schooling and experience enter
arithmetically. The additional advantages of the semi—log formulation is
that it eliminates the interaction between s and t, and it provides analyses
of relative inequality, which is of greater interest than absolute dis-
persion.
The explanatory power of the semi—log form when schooling and20
experience are expressed in years has been shown to be superior to the
arithmetical or double—log specification of the same variables. [Heckman
and Polachek, 19741,
The role of schooland the conceptof "overtaking"
Simple correlations between earnings and years of schooling
are quite weak. Moreover, in multiple regressions when variables corre-
lated with schooling are added, the regression coefficient of schooling
is very small. This leads to a view, which is regaining currency, that
schooling matters very little, insofar as earnings are concerned. (Ironi-
cally, an opposite view, sometimes held by the same people, is that
schooling may matter in earnings but has little to do with learning.)
The human capital approach suggests that such conclusion is too hasty.
In the 1960 U.s. data previously referred to, the simple
coefficient of determination between log—earnings and years of schooling
for the whole sample was merely 7%. Standardizing for effects of age
doubles the coefficient in age groups 35—44, but the coefficient weakens
in younger and older groups. The human capital framework suggests
that the proper standarlization is by years of experience, but even then
we find that the correlation differs a great deal depending on which
years—of—experience groups we consider. What stage of experience is the
Table 2
most appropriate for observing effects of schooling, least contaminated
by other factors? The answer of the human capital model is: during the
first year of experience, if no further investments in human capital wereTABLE 2
CORRELATIONOF LOG EARNINGS WITH ScHoOLING
WITHIN EXPERIENCE OR AGE GROUPS
Coeff. of Del. (r2) —- —-——- Coeff.
Year- ofDet.
Years of All round Years of (r2)
Experience (1) (2) Age (3)
.
1—3 .31 .25
4—6 .30 .27 20—24 .02
7—9 .33 .30 25—29 .04
10—12 .26 .30 30—34 .11
13—15 .20 .25 35—39 .14
16—18 .17 .20 40—44 .16
19—21 .16 .18 45—49 .12
22—24 .13 .17 50—54 .12
25—27 .13 .15 55—60 .09




Aggregate .07 .08 Aggregate .07
SOURCE: 1/1,000 sample of the U.S. Census, 1960.
a. All workers, including both year-round and those whose work was
part time, seasonal, or otherwise intermittent.
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undertaken beyond schooling. In that case, by equation (6) and with the
approximation K =1,indeed
in E =inE0 + rs (13)
would be the best specification. The existence of post—school investments,
however, makes E8 unobservable. Instead we observe Y E5 —C0when
C80 is the amount invested in the first year of work experience. Earnings
are initially smaller than E, but as they rise with experience they
eventually reach the level Es. Given a rate of return on human capital
investments equal to r, E5 is the level of a horizontal earnings flow
whose present value is equal to the present value of the actual earnings
stream Y, both discounted at the rate r at the beginning of working life.
Since the coefficients of the earnings function provide estimates of r,
these intersection ("overtaking") points were found to locate at a little
less than a decade of experience.9 The overtaking period, of course,
9 It is easily shown a priori that the "overtaking"year of experience
￿ ,ifpost—school investments do not increase over time:
=E+ r E C —C t S='t
For =E5,the remaining terms on the right must be zero.
1 —
Hencer tC =C,t=— , whereC Is the average amount
invested per year over the firstyears of experience.
Thus22
differs among individuals depending on their initial post—school earning
capacities E5, rates of return, and their post—school investment profile.
Using average profiles of schooling groups, a rough central tendency was
located within the 7—9 year interval.
To repeat, theoretically, the correlation between iritial gross
earnings and schooling would clearly bring out the effect of schooling,
and would decay with each successive year of experience, unless post—
school investments were perfectly correlated with schooling investments.
The distribution of initial gross earnings is not observable, but it is
roughly approximated by the distribution of observed earnings at the
"overtaking stage" of experience.
At that stage the coefficient of determination represents an
estimate of the fraction of earnings inequality that is attributable to
differences in schooling. It should be higher than the correlation with
initially observed earnings, if the exact "overtaking" point could be
found for each individual, and should decay thereafter. This pattern
Is observed in Table 2, and the coefficient of determination at "over—
taking" exceeds 30%.
The inequality of earnings at the overtaking stage amounts to
about 70% of aggregate inequality in the 1960 sample. If the remaining
30% are largely attributable to individual differences in post—school
investments (including depreciation), and a third of the inequality at
"overtaking" is due to schooling differentials, together a half of total
inequality of observed earnings can be attributed to the distributions
of schooling and post—school investments. The 50% figure is probably
I23
an understatement. It fails to reflect differences in investments in
quality of schooling,'0 and it does not take account of the differences
10 There isa growing literature on this subject which far exceeds the
bounds of this paper. See note 6 for human capital approaches. ?iy
rough estimate based on this work is that the inclusion of schooling
quality would raise the explanatory power of human capital by over 5%.
in hours worked during the year which are induced by differences in human
capital investment. The true residual, which is less than half of ob-
served inequality, is due to individual differences in rates of return
to human capital investments, transitory variation in employment during
the year, and a portmanteau of everything else which we may call "chance."
The earnings structure
There are several prominent features of the statistical distri-
bution of earnings (and income) which are repeatedly observed in temporally
and regionally differing data. Aggregate skewness and the growth of
inequality with age are the best known. Shapes of distributions cross—
classified by schooling and experience are less familiar, and perhaps
less stable. These characteristic features of earnings distributions
have puzzled observers since detailed statistical data became available.
Partial explanations, largely of the "random shock" variety, have been
proposed.
In the human capital model, most of these features can be
explained by the correlation between the stock of human capital at any
stage of the life cycle and the volume of subsequent investment. This24
correlation is understandable, if factors of ability and of opportunity
which affect individual investment behavior tend to persist over lengthy
periods of a person's life. For example, the absolute growth of dollar
earnings with experience is greater at higher schooling levels.
Since the slope of the earnings profile at time t reflects
investment in the prior period, this relation is an example of the
persistence of levels of investment in schooling and afterwards.
Several other implications of the positive correlation between
successive instalments of investment in human capital in dollar terms
can be observed. Dollar profiles of earnings"fan out's with experience
and, a fortiori, with age, both across and within schooling groups.
Dollar variances in these groups, therefore, increase with experience
and with age. Similarly, because the dispersion of dollar schooling
costs increases with the level of schooling, variances of earnings
increase with level of schooling. Since mean earnings increase with
experience and with schooling, there is a positive correlation between
means and variances in age and schooling subgroups of the earnings
distribution. This correlation contributes to the appearance of positive
skewness in the aggregate earnings distribution. This factor is inde-
pendent of, and in a way more basic than, the shape of the distribution
of schooling, which in the past also contributed to the positive skewness
in earnings.
According to the relation ln =ln + rs, earnings (at
"overtaking") tend to be positively skewed even if the distribution
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of years of schooling s is symmetric.11 Distributionof years of schooling
This is a sufficient condition. For a precise formulation see Mincer
[1974, p. J.
tend'to be positively skewed when the average level of schooling is low
and to become symmetric at higher levels. In the U.S. skewness in the
distribution of schooling has turned negative in the younger cohorts.
So the shape of the distribution of schooling is no longer an important
factor in explaining the persistence of positive skewness in the distri-
bution of earnings in the U.S. Since the level of schooling in the U.S.
is among the highest, aggregate skewness in earnings in most countries
follows a fortiori.
If we define relative skill differentials by percent differen-
tials in wage rates among schooling groups having comparable years of
experience, we find that these are almost invariant over the working
life. Since the logarithmic experienc.e profiles of wages are concave,
this finding implies that relative wage differentials among schooling
groups increase with age. However, within schooling groups, relative
wage dispersions, measured by variances of logs, show somewhat different
profiles, depending on the level of schooling. When plotted against age,
all are U—shaped along at least some portion of the curve, and clearly
so at the center of the schooling distribution, that is, for the high—
school group. For the post—high—school group, the profile is mainly
increasing. Within lower schooling groups, it first decreases and then
levels off.
Both the wage differentials between schooling levels and the26
inequality patterns within the middle levels of schooling reflect a
negligible correlation between post—school learning capacity and time—
equivalent post—school investment. This same lack of correlation underlies
the invariance between experience and relative wage differentials among
schooling groups. The phenomenon arises if experience profiles of
post—school investments, in time—equivalent units, are not systematically
different among schooling groups. Put another way, it arises when the
elasticity of post—school investments (in dollars) with respect to post—
school earning capacity is, on average, unitary across schooling groups.
Within schooling groups, however, the elasticity of investment with
respect to earning capacity appears to increase with schooling level:
it is less than 1 at lower levels and greater than 1 at higher levels.
The size of the elasticities and the systematic positive
relation between schooling level and elasticity of investment with res—
pect to earning capacity raise questions for further research. In this
connection, it is noteworthy and suggestive that very similar patterns
are found in studying the consumption function: The tilong_runit elasticity
of saving with respect to income is not clearly different from 1, and
the tTshort_runtt or cross—sectional elasticity increases with schooling
level [Solmon, 1972].
5. Human Capital_Versus Stochastic Models
In stochastic theories of income distribution Cjisinterpreted
as year—to—year individual fluctuation in earnings and the whole structure
of earnings is explained by a stochastic process that is attributed to
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this "random shock" c1. These models specify that:
t
v =lnYj =inY0+E (14)
j =1
where thecj are homoscedastic and mutually independent. This leads to
a monotonically increasing log variance as a function of t (age or
experience), and a positively skewed aggregate distribution (log—normal
or Pareto, depending on differences in assumptions). But, as we have
seen, the prediction that logarithmic variances of income grow monoto—
nically and equally in all skill (schooling) groups is largely incorrect.
The greater and richer explanatory power of the human capital
model need not preclude some validity in therandom shock approach.
Moreover, some of the predictions are similar: log variances of earnings
do grow in some schooling groups and over certain phases of the working
life. Even so, the same empirical phenomena are differently interpreted
in the two models. In the stochastic models temporal variation in income
is interpreted as chance variation. In contrast, in human capital models,
much of the temporal variation in earnings is viewed as a systematic and
persistent consequence of cumulative investment behavior. Discrimination
between the two views can be sought in so—called panel correlations of
earnings of the same cohort in two different time periods.
If we follow the earnings experience of a cohort m years after
the initial year t, the random shock model implies that: (1) log variances
will increase by the same amount e2(c) each year, so that:
a2(ln+m) =e2(ln + mo2(c) ; (15)
and (2) panel correlations, that is, correlations between in and in Yt+m28
will decay continuously as the interval m is widened: •
q2(lnYt)
R2 (in Y, ln =2' , (16)
ln t+m)
and
r 1 1+ m
L02(lnYt)J • (17)
According to the random shock model, both variances and the
reciprocals of the coefficients of determination should increase linearly
with the time interval m. We have already seen a contradiction in that
the profiles of variances are not linear. If it could be assumed that
the profiles are linear, the steeper slope at the higher schooling level
implies a greater importance of random shock there, that is, a larger
hencea more rapid decay of panel correlations in the higher
schooling groups (since G2(c)/2(ln would be larger at higher schooling
levels). Again, this implication is not substantiated in Table 3, which
is based on a 1959 survey of the Consumers Union Panel12 and contains
12 Therewere 4,191 usable responses in the recall data. Over half of
the respondents were college graduates. For a detailed description of
the data, see Juster [1964].
panel correlations (R2) and their inverses (1/R2). Data on past earnings
from which thecorrelationswere calculated are based on recall of res-
pondents. Recall data probably contain a great deal of error, which may
affect the level and pattern of the coefficients of determination. In
an attcmpt to minimize this error, correlations of earnings at tandt+mTABLE 3
PANELCORRELATIONS OF MALE EARNINGS, BASED ON CONSUMERS UNION PANEL, 1959 SURVEY
Years of Schooling
l2orLess 13—15 16 l7orMore AU
Initial —-—--—-—---————--- ----—------———- —________
Yoar(t) 2 7 11 2 7 11 2 7 11 2 7 11 2 7 11
Coefficients of Determination (R)
4 .989.227.312 .911 .444 .518.854 .302 .376.803 .441 .316.822 .388.4
7 .951.220.268 .852.324 .265.691 .383 .381 .760 .430 .388.752.426.348
9 .711 .491 .279 .800.396 .483.712.598 .527.800 .461 .381 .785.503.453
12 .837.654.498 .907.648 .616.889 .581 .552.897.528 .679.878.578.586
15 .846 .520 412 .816.684.507 .932.538 .615 .873.555 .608.824.630.608
18 .818.588.399 .898.604 .591 .918.652.662 .887.652 .739 .898 .681 .714
21 .899 .483.498 .839.699 .643 .874 .771 .755 .925 .771 .596 .871.716.658
24 .828 .419.403 .931 764.688 .966 .768 .715 .908.868 .637 .930 .788.648
27 .902 .682.744 .935.801 .860 .955 .765.757 .982.794 .419 .952 .793 .781
Average.864 .476.423 .876.596.574 .865 .595.593 .870 .611 .529 .856 .611 .580
Reciprocals of R
Average of
t= 4, 7 1.0314.4753.4681.1352.669 2.8521.3082.960 26411.2802.3012.8721.2722.4622.598
All 1.1652.4512.5881.1431.8341.9141.1701.8451.8961.1551.7442.0511.1721.7351.833
(= 12 1.1701.6452.1291.1291.4401.5761.0851.5031.4981.0971.5051.6831.1281.4511.515
NOTE: Earnings at t years of experience are correlated with earnings at t m years of experience; t + m is in 1959 for eachof the
cohorts; m = 2,7, or 11, as indicated in the column headings29
years of experience were observed only in those cohorts whose experience
did not exceed t+m. Thus, only rows in Table 3 pertain to given cohorts.
Years of experience were provided by respondents as time elapsed since
they first entered full—time employment.
Despite the unpredictable effects of errors in such data, there
are two features in the table that are noteworthy: (1) As the interval m
is widened from two to seven years, the correlation declines sharply when
the panel base t is in the first decade of experience. The decline is
much milder thereafter.(2) When the interval m is widened further,
from seven to eleven years, the decline in correlation, if any, is
negligible. The growth in hR2 is not linea, particularly over the
earlier decades of experience. These findings are clearly inconsistent
with the random shock model. They do seem reasonable in the light of
the human capital model: panel correlations bracketing the overtaking
stage would be expected to be relatively weak, but stronger thereafter.
When the interval brackets the overtaking point, we are correlating
t—l




in E5 + (rKj —Kt+m)
j =1
By definition, the post—school investme.nt component of earnings is
negative before overtaking and positive thereafter. The bracketing,
therefore, introduces a negative correlation between the investment com-
ponents of earnings, which weakens the panel correlation. Indeed, if
.30
all were equal this correlation would be negative)-3 The sharp decel—
13
John Hause [1974] attempted to test the implied negative partial
correlation of the human capital model in two longitudinal samples. The
data were those collected by A. Husn in Sweden and by D. C. Dogers in
the U.S. The correlation was erratic in the first set, for which a very
short time span (4—5 years) was used. It was negative in the second set.
Paul Taubman [1974] uses the NBER—TH sample and uses a simple
instead of a partial correlation. The simple correlation need not be
and is not negative when earning capacity at 'overtaking" is not fixed.
eration or even halt in the decline of correlations beyond a seven—year
span is not implausible: beyond tiovertaking "theranking of individual
earnings acquires a long—run stability, though disturbed by short—run,
tttransitorytl fluctuations.
-
Incontrast to the purely stochastic models of income distribution,
which are not capable of covering much ground, two sophisticated studies
of earnings combine earnings functions which have much in common with
the human capital approach, with rigorous stochastic specifications of
the residual variation:
M. M. Fase [1970] studied a sample of Dutch incomes. In his
model an individual starts his career at the age of s years. The annual
rate of increase in the salary is assumed to decline linearly with age,
starting at s. In addition, a random disturbance dram from a log—normal
distribution contributes to the annual change in the logarithm of income.
Fase acknowledges the human capital interpretation of his model, though
it did not originally motivate his work.31
In A. Klevrnarken's l972] study of Swedish earnings 'lata, the
human capital concepts are well recognized, His treatment of thestochastic
component is less restrictive than in Fase..One of the conceptual
improvements is the distinction between 'physical' and'active"age14—--
14 Separation of thetwo effects was attempted more intensively in a more
recent study of Kicvrnarken and Quigley [1973j.
that is, between age and labor market enperience. Another, econometric
improvement isthepooling of cross---sect:Lon and cohort data.
6. OccuiatonalUageSt'ucture
Occupational '1skill differentials' in wages are commonly measured
by the percentage difference between adult male wage rates in sets of
pairs of narrowly defined occupations. The choice of pairs, the defi-
nition of wages, and the changing skill contents make the interpretation
of such comparisons and of trends in them as trends in relative factor
prices rather uncertain. The often steep rise of earnings with age
(experience) suggests that the differing age distribution among occupa-
tionsis another source of ambiguity in these measures.
An acceleration of upwardtrends in schooling raises tile average
age in the lower schooling and skill groups and lowers it in the upper
groups. This produces an apparent narrowing of relative wage differen-
tials, which may be misinterpreted as a relative price change, plausibly
resulting from changes in relative supplies. flut the apparent compression
of the wage differential may simply he an artifact. .32
According to my analysis, even standardizaLion forage is gener-
ally insufficient.The appropriate analysis must take into account the
occupational experience profiles as well as the schooling component of
occupationalskill, at the very least .Aninteresting analysis of this
sortwas carried out by C. M. Rahm [1971] who fit earnings function to
mean earnings in over 500 detailGd occupations listed in the 1960 U.S.
Census. His results are shown in Table4 below.
Table4




(1)in 7.005 + .128s .29
(.009)
(2)in Y =5.112+.151s + .164t —.0031t2 .58
(.007) (.013) (.0003)
(3) ln Y .491 + .106s + .094t —.0017t2+1.513 in W .71
(.007)(.012)(.0003) (.097)
Rahmthus explained 60--707 of the inter—occupational relative wage
differentials with these few variables. The effects of schooling and
of experience across occupations was similar to the estimates for
individuals in our Table 1.In large part, then, occupation can he33
viewedas a composite of skills acquired in scIioolia and on thejob.
Rahm ran similar regressions on 116 less detailed occupations
which were comparable in the Census years 1940, 1950, and 1960. The
results were similar, over the years, though the R2 were inflated by
aggregation,1-5 and so were the coefficients of experience t.Theonly
15 The J2 for 1959were .83 in (2) and .87 in (3).
coefficient which changed since 1939 was that on schooling. It dropped
from l4i.n 1940to10%in 1950 and 1960. The wel]Iknown decrease in
earnings inequality which occurred between the first two periods is
evidently associated, in part, with this decine in the rate of return
to schooling, since the variance in schooling did not change much (it
narrowed slightly) 16 . 16The other part is due to the narrowing of the variance in the weeks—
worked variable.Cf. Mincer andChiswjck {1972j.
Rabin's analysis assumes the same effects of schooling and of
experienceacross the various occupations, so the parameter estimates
are average effects. An analysis in which these effects are allowed to
differ would be desirable for a number of purposes, not the least of
which is an insight into differential post—school job skill investments.
7. gionaiDffirencesandTemJoralhngesf.nIncomeDis t rib u tions
By taking variances of both sides of the earnings function (10),
relative income inequality canhe exprescdas a function of means,var—
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lancesand covariances in schooling, experience, and cnployment, and of
parameters such as the average rates of return estimated as coefficients
in the earnings function. Using data on adult males in the various states
of the U.S., Chiswick [1974] estimated earnings functions within the
regions and related the differences in the means, variances, correlations,
and rates of return to differences in aggregate inequality between regions.
Witl this variance formulation of the earnings function Chiswick was able
to explain 85—90% of theinter—regionaldifferentials in relative income
(or earnings) inequality. The most important explanatory variables were
the(average) rate of return on human capital (cducation) and variances
in the distribution of eipployrnent (weeks worked), in the age, and in the
schooling distribution.
Basically the same approach was taken by Mincer and Chiswiel
[1972] in a time—series analysis of annual changes in income inequality
in the U.S. between 1939 and 1969. For males in the 25—64 age group
there were no perceptible net trends in inequality between 1949 and 1969.
87%of the annual variation in inequality during this period was explained
by changes in thedistributions of employment, age, and schooling. The
rateof return was assuued fixed in the annual data. On the other hand,
the strong decline in inequality beteen1939and 1949 wasattributable,
in large part, to the decline in the variance ofemployment——acorrelate
of the decline in the level of unemployment——, and to a decline in the
rate of return to schoolin, observed in otherdataJ7
7cf. referenceto Rahmi [1971] •in the precedin. section.
Asensitivity analysis of the variance formof the earnings35
functionsuggests that even large changes (n standard deviation units)
in the distribution of schooling and agehaveminor effects on annual
earnings inequality and that change in the distribution of employment,
whichis a cyclical variable, has stronger effects. The strongest effects
are produced by changes in rates of return.
Going back in time prior to 1939, the narrowing of income
inequality over the first half of this century is consistent with
apparent declines in rates of return, as fragmentary evidence on both
phenomenaindicates.Growth of income, insofar as it leads to consumption—
motivatedgrowth in thedemandforeducation, tends to depress rates of
return and, thereby, to narrow inequality. At the same time, however,
the growth in incomes is a result of growth in market productivity which
probably generates growing demands for skills in the labor market. In
the two decades prior to 1970 such growth must have been strong to keep
the rates of return andinequalityrather stable.
Though, apart from its effects on rates of return, the secular
growth of education has minor effects on inequality, it has several
distinguishable effects on the observed earnings structure:(1) Growth
of schooling appearsto be associated with adecline in the dispersion
and in the positive skewness of the dist±ihution of schooling. This is
largely due to a natural (zero) or legislated (positive) lower limit on
years of schooling. The decreased dispersion in the distribution of
schooling in 1960 may also be a lagged effect of the narrowinginequality
ofparental income that was observed before 1950. The distribution of
earnings within age groups in current data reflects the effects of a mild
secular narrowing in the dispersion of schooling and of a stronger36
reduction in its skewness, to thepoint where it is now negative.
(2)Acceleration of schooling trends produces additional reductions in
inequality: the meaning of the upward trends in education is that the
level of education is higher in young than in old ige groups. This
offsets in part, the age variation in earnings,whichis clue to the
growth of experience with age.Another consequence is that the relative
numericalimportance of the young and least educated and old and most
educatedgrouts becomes smaller the more rapid the upward educational
trends. But these are precisely the groups ':Lthin which the inequality
in earnings is largest [Mincer, 19741. Therefore, the stronger the upward
trend in schooling, the smaller the aggregate inequality in earnings.
It can be shown [tthicer, 1974] that,if growth inschooling ceased and
the distribution of schooling in each age group remained the same as
among youag earners with less than a decade of work experience in 1960,
aggregate earnings inequality in the U.S. would becoite 10% larger than
itwasin1960.(3) Seculertrends in education also affect the
distributionof income indirectly viaeffectson the composition of the
labor force andthe resulting distribution of employment. The lengthening
ofschooling andincreased enrollmentproduced a growing interniittent
student labor force. Thegrowthof education of women contributed to
agrowing female labor force which is also frequently intermittent.
Growth of part—period and part—time work widens the dispersion of employ-
ment, which tends to widen the inequality in annual earnings. Thus,
when all earners (men, women, and teenagers) arc included, inequality
in annual earnings has indeed widened in the U.S. in the past two decades.
Thisisnot true, however, infull—time or hourly earnings of mcii, nor37
isit true when inequality is measured across family units rather than
18 acrosspersons.
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Indeed, the inequality of income among families has had a slight down-
wardtrend, related to the growing labor force participation of married
(I9J women. Fora similarfinding in Britain, see H. Lydall 1 .The
analysis of this phenomenon is outside the scope of this paper. It in-
volves the consideration of labor supply and human capital decisions
within thefamilycontext.
8.EarniniLs of Women
lnthepost—school stage of the life cycle much of the accumu-
lation of earning power t:akes place in the labor market. The experience
variable in the earnings equation acts as a representation of the sequence
ofjob investments(ratios> of labor force participants. Where past
work experience of men can be measured without much error in number of
years elapsed since leaving school, such a measure of "tt.1 work
experience' is clearly inadequate19 for workers whose labor force exper—
19Such a measure was used in earnings functions of women by R. Oaxaca
[1973].
ienceisdiscontinuous. Therefore, a basic requirement for the analysis
of earnings of women is direct information on their work histories.
The 1967 National Longitudinal Survey of Work Experience20
20For a description of the ULS Survey, see Shea, Spitz,andZeller [1970].38
carried out by the U.S. Department of Labor contains work historIes and
other characteristics of a large sample of women who were between 30 and
44 years old in 1967. The heretofore unavailable opportunity afforded
by the NLS, albeit on a retrospective basis, was exploited by Mincer and
Polachek in a recent study [1974].
According to thedata,less than 50% of the mothers worked in
1966, but close to 90% worked some time since they left school, and
two—thirds returned to the labor market some time after the birth of the
first child, but not necessarily permanently. In contrast, women without
husbandsand without children spent close to 90% of the years in contin-
uous labor market activities, In terms of chronology, the life cycle
of married women features several stages which differ iii the nature and
degree of labor market and home involvement. There is usually continuous
market work prior to the birth of the first child. The second stage is
a period of nonparticipation related to child bearing and child care,
lasting 5—10 years, followed by intermittent participation before the
youngest child reaches school age. The third stage is a more permanent
return to the labor force for some, though it may remain intermittent
for others. In the data which were obtained from women who were less
than 45 years 01(1, only the beginning of the third stage as visible.
A number of implications about human capital investment behavior
ofwomen are plausible, given expectations of such lifetime work patterns
by the average woman. Of course, the expectations and the patterns are
changing, and women's human capital investment behavior can he expected
to change correspondingly. But, 1eavinc aside trends,21 wehypothesize that:
21 Inmy view societal expectations and rhetoric follow rather than precede39
thechanging facts. The basic fact in the trends isthe riseinreal
market wages. If these rose more rapidly than productivity in the house-
hold, as seems plausible, the upward trends in labor force participation
of women and downward tren1s in fertility, and related changes in the
family,become intelJigib1e. Cf. Mincer [1962] and [1963].
1. The smaller the expected lifetime participation in the labor
market the less the investment (or vocational) aspects of women's formal
education, and the less the acquisition of job training at work compared
to men with comparable education.
2.Duringtheperiod ofchild—bearing and child care, prolonged
nonparticipationmay cause the skills acquited at school and at work to
depreciate.
3. There is likely to beastronger expectation of prospective
continu:Lty of employment after the children reach school age. At this
stagewomen who return to the labor market may have strong incentives
to resume investments in job—related skills.
4. These conjectures imply that the investment profile of
married women is not nionotonic, as was hypothesized for men. There is
a gap which is likely to show negative values (net depreciation) during
the child—bearing period. Labor market investments of never—married
women are likely to exceed those of married women, even initially, assuming
lesser expectations of marriage. At the same time they are smaller than
investments of men, since some of the never—married women had expectations
of marriage. The continuity of their work experience suggestsadeclining
investment profile, as in the case of men.
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5. The implications for earnings profiles are clear: Earnings
profiles of men are steepest and concave, of childless women less so,
andof notliers double—peaked with least overall growth.
Theseimplications are consistent with the empirical findings
in which we obtained parameter estimates of earnings functions especially
adapted for the purpose of the analysis. A brief exposition of these
"segmentedt1 earnings functions is appropriate, as their usefulness extends
beyond the particular application.41
S
Inorder to adapt the earnings function to persons with inter-
mittent work experience we break up the post-school investment term
into successive segments of participation and nonparticipation
as they occur chronologically. In the general case with n segments we
may express the investment ratio:
aj + bt , i
nt1 and in Et in F0 + rs + r E f (a.+ b.t)dt (18)
i=l ti
1 1
Here a. is the initial investsent ratio, b. is the rate of change of the
1 1.
th




=durationof the i segment.
Notethat in(18) theinitialinvestment ratio refers toits projected value
at t1 =0,the start ofworking life. In a rk interval ';hich
occurs in later life there islikely to.be less investment than inan
earlier interval j, though more than would be observed if j continued at
its gradient through theyears covered by m. In this case, a in equation (18)
will exceed a..
:
Alternatively,a. and a can be compared directly in the formulation:
in E ln E + rs + r If(a.+ b.t)dt
t 0 1 1 i=i 0
since a is the investment ratio at the beginning of the particular segment
1.
While the rate of change in investment b is likely to be negative
in longer intervals, it may not be significant in shorter ones. Since the
segments we observe in the histories of women before age 45arerelatively42
short, a simplified scheme is to assume a constant rate of net investrent
throughout a given segment, though differing amongsegments.The earnings
function simplifies to:




Where(ra,) >0denote positive net investment (ratios), while (ra.) <0represent
net depreciation rates, likely in periods of nonparticipation.
The question whether the annual investment or depreciation rates vary
with the length of the interval is ultimately an empirical one. Even if
each woman were to invest diminishing amounts over a segment of work exper-
ience, those women who stay longer in the labormarketare likely to invest
more per unit of time, so that a. is likely to be a positive function of
the length of the interval in the cross-sectjon.
Thus ever, if K.. =a..-b..t for a given ?oman j, if a.. =a.+ t
1.J 1] 1) 1)
acrosswomen, on substitution, the coefficient b of t maybecome negligible
oreven positive in the cross—section. 0n integrating, and using three
segments of working life as an example, earnings functions (18), (19),(20)
become:
















(2Oa) in Et = + rs+ r(a1e1 +a2e2
+
a3e3143
Inthis example, t is within the last (third) segment,and the middle segment,
e2
=h,is a period of nonparticipation or "home time." The signs of b. are
ambiguous in the cross-section, as already indicated; the coefficients of
e1
and of e3 are expected to be positive, but ofe2 (or h) negative, most
clearly in (20a).
The equations for observed earnings (in Yt) differ from the equations
shown above by a termln(i—)ç)-.vwuaLi —uLu-*
With W relativelysmall, only theintercept a0is affected,
so the same form holds for in Y as for in E
t t
It willhelp our understanding of the estimates of depreciation rates
toexpress earnings function (9a) in terms of gross investment rates and
depreciation rates:






This formulation suggests that depreciation of earning power may occur not
only in periods of nonparticipation (h), but at other times -as well. On
the other hand, market-orientedinvestment, such as informal study and job
search, may take place during "home time," sothat >0.Positive co-
efficients of e1ande3
wouldreflect positivenet investment, while a
negativecoefficient of h is an estimateof netdepreciation. If >0,
the absolute value of the depreciation rate6h isunderestimated.
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Findings:
(i) Investment and Earnings Profiles
Life histories of women who worked in 1966 were segmented into
five intervals: three of these were periods of work experience and two
were of non—market activity. According to equation C) thecoefficients
attached to these intervals (ei) represent estimates of gross investment
ratios minus depreciation.
Investment magnitudes implied by these coefficients were lowest
for married women with children, higher for women without children, and
highest for never—married women. They were lower for women who worked
less than half of their post—school years than for those who worked more.
The relations with level of schooling appeared also to be
positive, though less clearly.
The investment profile of never—married women was declining,
as indicated by a negative coefficient of the experience variable in the
earnings function. On the other hand, mothers over age 35 who have re-
turned to the labor market showed higher coefficients for the current
than for the prematernal interval. Presumably, their current market work
is expected to last longer than the previous periods of work experience.
The coefficients for the two periods of non—participation were
negative, indicating a net depreciation rate amounting to 1.5% per year,
on average, and increasing with educational level. This was pronounced
for coefficient attached to the uninterrupted inverval of non—participation
lasting several years, which followed the birth of the first child. The
length of these t1home time" intervals was related to numbcs of children.45
Induction of numbers of children as an additional variable in the earnings
function therefore had no significant (negative) effect, except in the
small subgroup of hIghly educated women.
(2) lltinEarninofWomen
Judgingby R2 in Table 5, the earnings function is capable of ex-
plaining 25—30 per cent of the relative (logarithmic) dispersion in
wage rates of white married men and about 40% of the inequality in the
rather small sample of wage rates of single womeninthe 3044 age group,
who worked in 1966. The earnings function is thus no less useful in under-
standing the structure of women's wages than it is in the analysis of wages
of males.
The dispersion of hours worked during the survey year is much greater
among married women,2(ln H).75, than among men2 (in H) =.11.The
(relative) dispersion in annual earnings of women is, therefore, dominated
by the dispersion of hours worked. This factor is also important in the
inequality of annual earnings of single women and of men of comparable ages,
but much less so.Itisnotsurprising, therefore, that the inclusion of
hours worked in the earnings function, raises the coefficient of determination
from 28int1i hourly wage equation to 78% in the annual earnings equation
ofmarriedwomen,from41%to£Sforsinglewomen, andfrom 32 to 50%for
men.
The lesser inequality in the wage rate structure of working married
women than in the structure of male wages is probably due to lesser average,
and hence lesser variation in, job investments aung individuals. At the
sametime the hugevariationin hours, reflecting intermittancyand part—.TABLE 5
EarningsInequality and Explanatory Power of Wacje Functions
(White 1arriedWomen, Single Women, andMarried Men, 1966)
2 2 2 2. 2 (mW) R 5(mY) j(inN) n
All_Married Women .22 .28 .97 .78 .75 1,140
13 S<12 .17 .21 .81 •.76 .64 435
12—15 .18 .17 .92 .78 .74 622
education
+16 .17 .16 .77 .74 .60 83
Single Women .30 .41 .62 .66 .32 138,
Married lIen .32 .30 .43 .50 .11 3,230
O2(1nW)variance of (log) wages
52(1nY)variance of (log) annual earnings
(1nIi) =varianceof (log) annual hoursofwork
coefficient of determination in wage rate function
4= coefficientof determination in annual earnings function46
timework as forms of labor supply adjustments creates an annual earnings
inequality among women which exceeds that of men. However, the meaning
of that inequality both in a causal and In a welfare sense mustbe seen
inthe family context. As was shown elsewhere,22 the inclusion of female
22j•I1incer[1974].
earnings as a component of family Income narrows the relative inequality
of family incomes compared to that of incomes of male family earners.
(3) The Sex Dif feentialinjes
Acomparison of earnings functions of women with functions of
men of the same age (30—44) shown in Table 5 permits a rough accounting
for the relative wage differential between men and women which was close
to 40% between husbands and wives, and over 10% between men and single
women. The pronounced differences in levels of the independent variables
were in work experience. These differences alone (assuming the same
coefficients for men and women) accounted for close to a half of the wage
gap. Indeed, for a subgroup of women whose attachment to the labor force
was continuous the wage gap was reduced by nearly 60%. Whether the
remainder is mainly a matter of discrimination or of lower investment
rates——as we interpreted the coefficients——will remain debatable. The
evidence described above does not support a view that the association
of coefficients with prospective work experience is fortuitous.23
23 Cf. studies ofearnings of professiona1 women based on NSF data,
Johnson and Stafford [1973].
.TABLE 6
Experience andDepreciationCoefficients
WhiteIrried Women, Single Wollcn, andM:rried Men, 1ve30-44,166
Variables
Married Women S h e3
Regression Coefficients .063 .012 —.015 —.006 .009
Means l13 9.6 6.7 3.5 3.2
Single Wornon S e e2 e3
Regression Coefficients .077 .026-.0006 .009
Means 12.5 15,6 258 8.0
Marriedlen S e e2
RegressionCcefficic.nts .071 .034 —.0006
Means 11.6 19.4 409
Syears of schooling




e=2SLSestimate of total work experience
SourcesWomen,NT..S, 1967.
Men,SEQ, 1967.47
9. The Segmented Earnings Function and the AnalysisJob Mobi]Jty
1\
Theexperience term in the earnings function can be segmented in more
than one way. The segmentation into periods of market and non-market
activity was useful in analyzing earnings of women. Another useful segmen-
tation is into a sequence of intervals of job tenure. This is a novel
application of the earnings function for the study of labor mobility.
In this framework the gain from labor mobility, to the extent that the
latter is voluntary,24 can be seen as a package containing both immediate
can be distinguished in the data, which report whether job
change followed a quit or a lay-off.
gains in wages as well as job-investment options. Investment rates,
producing rates of change in earnings can be inferred from coefficients of
the job segments. Returns tocosts of (geographic) mobility can also be
distinguished, with appropriate data.
Several sets of longitudinal data, including the previously referred
to NLS, the NBER-TH, and the Coleman-Rossi sample are currently analyzed in
this fashion by my associates at the National Bureau. The NLS and the
NBER—TH are panels with some retrospective information, mainly on work
histories, while the Coleman-Rossi sample is fully retrospective, both
in work experience and in earnings.
Tha analysis of work histories has now been applied to xpand the
earnings functions of men aged 45—59 in the NLS data. Preliminary results
indicate relations between labor mobility, job stability, and earpings.
.48
Longer duration of job tenure is associated w:ith larger investments on
the job. This suggests thatworr self—investments -whichthe earnings
function is supposed to reflect in its coefficients -arepositively related
to employer investment in workers. The longer duration of job tenure is
likely to be an outcome or corollary of such joint investment which are
firm specific,25 according to the theory formulated by Becker [1964]
25The role of specific training inearnings functions was analyzed
in an excellent study of Japanese data by M. Kuratani [1972]. Itwas also
explored in a study of differences between occupational earnings of men
and women by L. Landes 11974].
Though job mobility apparently enhances earnings at younger ages,
it is associated with lesser earning and growth at olderages. Part of the
explanation may be the differential mix of quits and layoffs in the two
age groups.
The specific training hypothesis creates certain biases in the
coefficients of the segmented function, upward on the current job coefficient
and downward on the preceding ones. Research on the estimation of these
biases is currently proceeding at NBER.
The explanatory power of earnings functions which take account of
work histories is significantly greater (close to 10% in the NLS data)
than that of the function which utilizes undifferentiated total experience
in addition to schooling.49
10. Background Variables: Ability and Opportunity.
(a) Ability and Screening
The repeatedly observed positive correlation between educational
attainment socioeconomic background, and assorted measures ot ability
poses an obvious question: Would more educated people earn more in any
case, or is the added income really a product of the schooling process?
This question has motivated a great deal of research for the purpose of
estimating biases in the schooling coefficients when these variables
are, presumably improperly omitted. These efforts have taken the form
of adding various measures of ability (5uch as Q )andof family socio-
economic status (measured in a variety of ways) to the earnings function.
The variables themselves, of course, are not very reliable measures
and their inclusion in a single equation is theoretically inappropriate.
At any rate, in these studies the inclusion ofmeasurd ability reduces
the coefficient of schooling from 5to35 percent, depending on the data
26
and the measures used.
26cf. Gintis [1971], Griliches and Mason [1972], Hause [1972], Taubman
and Wales [19711].
Aside from the proliferation of types of ability measures (from
IQ to AFQT) there is a problem with the age at which the measure was
taken. As is well known, these rneasues grow over time with age and
with the early growth of human capital (until late adolescence).In
a notable study, Griliches and Mason [1972] estimated that the coeffi-
cient of schooling is reduced by 7-lO, if the correction allows for
ability prior to schooling, while post-school measured ability was 1113
additional percentile points higher for each addition3l year of schooling.
Thus, if post—school ''ahi lity'' measurcs arc used, the dowarc1bias 1n tlie50
schooling coefficient is exaggerated by almost1000/o.
The role of ability in affecting earnings has been interpreted
as indirect anddirect. Indirectly, it is an input to the produc-
tion of human capital, either as an initial stock or as an efficiency
parameter. Moreover, it affects earnings directly: the more capable
graduates of the same schools earn more. Thus when the ability vari-
able is entered together with schooling in the earnings function, the
coefficient of schooling is reduced, but both coefficients remain sig-
ni ficant.
According to an alternative hypothesis, the productivity effects
on earnings derive mainly from ability, not from school ing.So ability
is what really matters, and the indirection is only apparent, because
schooling serves merely as a screen conveying the information about
relevant abilities, or other desirable characteristics of job applicants,
to employers.In principle, the productivity and screening functions
of schooling are not mutually exclusive in a world of imperfect informa-
tion, given that ability is an -as.pee-. in the educational process. The contro-
versy, if any,is on the relative importance of the productivity and
screening functions ofschooling in affecting earnings. Unless
screening is a deliberate device for monopolization its effect on
earnings can neither be major nor durable, once productivity of the worker
can be directly observed. Moreover, the characteristics for which
schooling serves as a screen could be discovered by means of direct
interviewingand testing much more cheaply than by expenditures of
many years and tens of thousands of dollars on an average education.51
Markets for testing would surely spring up if such tremendous savings
were possible.
Even the advocates of screening as the major function of schooling
do not maintain that the screen is permanent.If it were, the correlation
of schooling with earnings would be fixed at all levels of work experience.
This is obviously false, as our Table (2 )shows. If the sorting effect
is temporary, the correlation should be strongest at the outset of work
experience and decay progressively, and perhaps quite rapidly thereafter.
A test of discrimination from the human capital model is possible here,
because the correlation implied by it is somewhat different. The human
capital model suggests that the correlation between gross earnings and
schooling will decline with experience, because of individual differences
in post—school job investments. Investments are larger in earliest years,
so the correlation between schooling and observed earnings (=grossearnings
minus investment) is biased downward, but the downward bias decreases
with experience. At the ''overtakingt point, observed earnings approximate
initial gross earnings, so the correlation of schooling with observed
earnings y,ould be strongest at that point, if it could be precisely
determined for each individual. Despite the imprecision in empirically
determining individual ''overtaking'' points, our Table 2 shows that the
correlation between schooling and earnings does not start to decay before
the fi rst decade of experience.
(b) Qportunity, Family Background, and ''Home Investments''
In considering the opportunity or socio—economic background variables
it is more difficult, than in the case of ability, to visualize direct effects52
on earnirigs7 unless what is meant is racial discrimination, class
collusion, or nepotism. The indirect effects may run via genetic in-
heritance, which would show in ability traits already discussed, or
in the quality of the early environment including purposive invest-
ment by parents in the early human capital stock of their children.
27Direct effects in consumption and onproperty income via gifts and
bequests are, of course, observable.
Most of the studies which include family background variables in
the earnings equations report small effects, net of the human capital
variables such as schooling and experience. On the other hand, the
background variables, which usually include parental occupation, edu-
cation, and numbers of siblings, are shown to be significant predic-
tors of the child's educational attainment.
The Griliches-t4ason work [1972] previously noted shows the impor-
tance of the indirect effect in another way: Their measure of schooling
is partitioned into school completed prior to serving in the armed forces
and subsequent schooling. By controlling for background variables, the
early schooling coefficient is reduced about 25 percent, but the post-
armed service school ing effect shows a negligible reduction. The
impression that the link between background and earnings is largely
the effect of background on the informal and formal learning environ-
ment is further supported by a number of studies which have shown that
the partial correlation between son's earnings and mother's education
is higher than the partial correlation between son's earnings and53
28
father's schooling especially if parental income is controlled for.
28The coefficients are notvery different without such control. Evi-
dently father's education is more strongly correlated with family income
than is mother's education. See Hunt [1963), hill and Stafford [19741,
Coleman [1974], Leibowitz [1974], Parsons [1974].
The major importance of indirect compared to direct effects of
family background shifts the focus of attention to parental efforts to-
ward accumulation of the human capital stock of their children. Much
of this accumulation takes place in the home, particularly during the
preschool stage of the life cycle, as well as later. It appears that
the education of parents is a significant variable even after controlling
for family income and numbers of siblings. This suggests that aside
from money expenditures on schooling, the quality and quantity of time
parents spend with children may be viewed as inputs in the child
quality (human capital). The time inputs are mainly those of
the mothers who take the major child care responsibi-
lities, and who reduce their market activities to engage in them. The
their
reduction in earnings which results from this reduction of time other—
A
wisespent in the labor market is a direct measure of the opportunity
cost of these investments. Estimates of these costs are feasible,
given data on women's wages, and their child-care activities in the home.
An illustrative calculation of such opportunity investment costs
of child care was performed on the 1966 NLS data on earnings and work
histories of women.29 On average, each additional child caused over
.
29Mincerand Polachek [l971], Table 9.54
2 years of interruption of work in the labor market.In 1966 dollars
the opportunity costs per child ranged from $7,000 for mothers with less
than high school education to $17,000 for mothers with college education
or more.In moneyterms, the difference in investment in pre-school
children among the higher and lower education group was equivalent to
a difference of 2-3 years of schooling.
Time cost of the mother is only a partial measure of parental
investments in preschool children. In principle, measures of such
investments might be incorporated in the earnings function framework.
From such functions we could tell more clearly whether these preschool
investments have an independent effect on earnings, beyond affecting
school attainment of the child. In any case, the greater earnings -
andpresumably also greater consumption capacities of children which are
associated with the higher level and quality of education they attain,
may be viewed in the family context as part of the return on the edu-
cation of mothers.
We can visualize the early production function of a child's
human capital as containing three inputs:the genetic endowment of
the child, parental contributions of market goods, and of their
own time. Thus far, research by economists has been confined to the
estimation and valuation of parental time inputs.We are only at
the beginning of research efforts into (1) the nature and scope of
parental efforts, given genetic and economic constraints, (2) the pro-
ductivity of these efforts in adding to the human capital stock of
children, and (3) the relative importance of parental contributions in
the ultimate level of the capital stock achieved by the hildren.55
Evidence on (2), that is on the relation between parental time
inputs and measures of child development, achievement, and earnings
is scant. Some evidence was found by A. Leibowitz [1974] in the
very special Ternian Sample in a simplified recursive scheme.Briefly,
she found that (a) parental time inputs as well as education of the
mother affected the childs IQ measure, (b) once IQ and both parental
educations are taken into account the time input measures have no further
effect on educational attainment of the child, and (c) once education
and experience of the adult son or daughter is taken into account, the
parental variables are of little consequence in affecting earnings.
The findings are still very fragile in this emerging economic
analysis of the role of the family in the formation of economic capa-
cities of children. Its potential payoff is clearly promising.It
lays the groundwork for a deeper exploration of income distri-
bution both among families and across generations.
(c) Toward a Fuller Specification of an Equilibrium System
The positive association between earnings, human capital variables,
ability, and socio—economic status raises questions of cause and effect
which still need to be resolved. The system can be viewed in two stages:
(1) Ability and opportunity factors affecting the accumulation of human
capital, and (2) The effect of human capital on earnings. The earnings
functions represent the second, or proximate stage of the system. In
terms of ultimate determinants, the background variables (stage 1) must
be brought into the analysis.It is clear, however, that the procedure
of putting such variables along with human capital variables ir the same
earnings equation is not correctfrom a structural point of view.
If investment in human capital results not from random behavior but from
optimizing behavior, the estimates of 'independent' effects of each of56
the variables are biased if all are included in the earnings function.
According to Becker's optimization analysis [1967], the earnings
function results from yo simultaneous structural relations in the human
capital market. These are demand functions (D.) which relate individual
investments tomarginal rates of return and supply functions (S.) which
relate the voluiiie of funds that can be obtained for human capital in-
vestments to their marginal costs. Of course, worker demand for self—
investment CD.) is, in part, derived from employer demand for the worker's
human capital. Optimizing behavior implies that the volume of individual
of
investments, the magnitude marginal and average returns, and therefore
of
the volume earnings are simultaneously determined by the intersection of
demand and supply curves.
The biases resulting from a disregard of the optimizing aspects of
behavior can be illustrated as follows: For a fixed level of human
capital there must be a perfect negative correlaton between ability and
opportunity: persons with greater ability invested no more than others
only because their opportunities were inferior, and conversely. Thus,
adding both sets of background variables alongside with measures of
human capital volumes is meaningless. If only one set of such vari-
ables is added, the explanatory power of the equation will be increased,
but the ''independent" effects of the background variables are still
misestimated.In principle, the appropriate statistical procedure is
a simultaneous equations model that could "identify" the opportunities
and capacities functions, including the effects oii both functions of
background and human capital accumulation. Experimentation
with empirically feasible specifications is a task of great urgency.
It is a major subject. of our current research efforts, as is the analysis
of the recursive structure of humaii capita] investment paths which lead57
from family background and parental efforts to the next generation's S
lifetime earnings.
H. Retrospect and Propect
Thehuman capital analysis reported in this review represents ini-
tial attempts to broaden the scope of earnings functions beyond the
exclusive attention formerly paid to school education. The econometric
models used are still deliberately parsimonious. Further expan$ion of
variables and equations are steps to be guided by current and future
theoretical development and empirical experimentation.
The simple forms described in the papr provided insight into the
distribution of earnings among individuals, males as well as females,
occupational wage differentials, effects of job mobility, regional
differences, and temporal changes in income distributions. The power
of the analysis was increased by the refinement ("segmentation'') of
the post-school investment category. Of course, we need to remember
that it is not time spent in the labor market, but the volume of in-
vestment activity taking place during that time which determines earn-
ings. Analyses of individual differences in post-school investment beha-
vior, will require richer panel data, in addition to job histories.
Moving to an earlier stage of the life cycle, consideration was
given to the notion and promise of analyzing paeuta1 investment in
children, particularly preschoolers. Additionally, the initial (genetic?)
levels of the human capital stock, subsequent investments in health, and
the life cycle of human capital depreciation, including the important
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problem of obsolescence, all deserve special analytical and empirical
attention.
The distinction between annual earnings andwage rates has not
been sufficiently emphasized in the work here reviewed.The proper
analytical distinction requires a marriage of labor supplyan human
capital theory, which is also needed in moving from personal tofamily
distributions of income.
The single earnings equation is basically a reduced form.There
is a need to estimate the structural relationsinvolving demand and
supply in the market for human capital investment funds and in the labor
marLet. Background factors of ability andopportunity which determine
investments in human capital will need to be specified ina systemat.c
fashion. Another and related structure that should be elucidatedis
the recursive chain leading from family backgroundto lifetime earnings
of the next generation.
Work has started on each of these topics at differentstages of
sophistication.it is encouraging to find that researchers in various
countries have found the human capital approach,mapped out here,
quite useful for analyzing their own societies and economies.30
30References aretocompleted studies of Fase [1970J, Klevmarken [1972],
Kuratani [1973], and Levy-Garboua [1973] whoanalyzed Dutch, Swedish,
Japanese, and French data respectively.59
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